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Mobile	  devices,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  smartphones	  and	  tablet	  computers,	  are	  going	  through	  
an	  amazing	  growth	  cycle.	  	  The	  devices	  are	  powerful	  and	  robust	  enough	  to	  house	  an	  
incredible	  amount	  of	  sensitive	  data	  about	  our	  personal	  and	  business	  lives.	  	  These	  
devices,	  however,	  have	  relatively	  weak	  authentication	  systems,	  generally	  consisting	  
of	  a	  pin	  number	  or	  pattern	  matching	  challenge.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  weak	  
authentication	  systems,	  the	  input	  mechanism	  of	  using	  a	  finger	  on	  a	  touchscreen	  
leaves	  a	  residue	  trail	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  recovered,	  allowing	  an	  attacker	  to	  recover	  
some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  authentication	  code.	  	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  strengths	  and	  
weaknesses	  of	  the	  authentication	  systems	  available	  on	  iOS	  and	  Android	  systems.	  	  It	  
then	  looks	  for	  alternative	  improved	  solutions	  by	  examining	  the	  array	  of	  sensor	  
technologies	  on	  current	  mobile	  devices.	  	  Three	  improved	  solutions	  are	  presented,	  
including	  a	  dynamic	  touchscreen	  pattern	  that	  removes	  the	  ability	  for	  a	  smudge	  
attack,	  a	  forced	  rotation	  authentication	  screen	  that	  obfuscates	  input	  patterns,	  and	  a	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The	  smartphone	  market	  has	  seen	  explosive	  growth	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  
Apple	  iPhone	  in	  2007.	  	  A	  number	  of	  viable	  competitors	  have	  emerged	  since,	  and	  the	  
smartphone	  is	  quickly	  becoming	  ubiquitous	  amongst	  nearly	  all	  market	  segments,	  
spanning	  all	  age	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  business	  /	  personal	  users.	  	  A	  similar	  explosion,	  
while	  earlier	  in	  the	  adoption	  curve,	  is	  being	  seen	  in	  the	  tablet	  computer	  market	  with	  
the	  release	  of	  the	  Apple	  iPad	  and	  various	  Android	  tablets.	  	  These	  devices	  have	  the	  
computing	  power,	  sensors,	  and	  supporting	  application	  availability	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  
house	  just	  as	  much,	  if	  not	  more,	  data	  than	  laptops	  and	  desktops.	  	  With	  the	  criticality	  
of	  information	  being	  stored	  on	  these	  devices,	  security	  is	  becoming	  an	  important	  
area	  of	  focus.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  NSA	  recently	  released	  a	  highly	  secured	  version	  of	  
Android,	  based	  on	  SELinux,	  called	  SEAndroid.	  	  (Hoover,	  2012)	  	  This	  version	  of	  
Android	  goes	  to	  great	  length	  to	  protect	  the	  runtime	  space	  of	  each	  application,	  to	  
protect	  critical	  applications	  from	  potentially	  malicious	  applications	  installed	  on	  the	  
device.	  	  One	  critical	  area	  that	  is	  often	  overlooked	  is	  the	  first	  layer	  of	  defense;	  the	  
unlock	  screen.	  	  The	  unlock	  screen	  is	  corollary	  in	  most	  cases	  to	  an	  operating	  system	  
password	  on	  traditional	  computers,	  an	  area	  that	  has	  seen	  much	  attention	  
throughout	  the	  years	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  improve	  security.	  	  The	  available	  lock	  screen	  
authentication	  challenges	  have	  weaknesses	  in	  terms	  of	  overall	  complexity	  as	  well	  as	  
by	  their	  input	  method.	  	  Lock	  screen	  authentication	  challenges	  require	  a	  user	  to	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unlock	  the	  device	  by	  interacting	  with	  a	  touch	  screen.	  	  This	  interaction	  leaves	  
significant	  residue	  on	  the	  screen	  that	  can	  allow	  an	  attacker	  to	  reverse	  engineer	  the	  
authentication	  code.	  	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  growing	  smartphone	  market	  and	  the	  
currently	  available	  authentication	  challenges	  that	  are	  in	  use.	  	  It	  examines	  their	  
overall	  complexity	  and	  points	  out	  weaknesses	  in	  their	  design.	  	  Finally,	  it	  examines	  
the	  available	  technologies	  common	  on	  current	  smartphones	  to	  identify	  alternative	  
and	  improved	  methods	  for	  authentication	  that	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  previously	  
identified	  weaknesses.	  	  
Growing	  market	  
Since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  iPhone	  by	  Apple	  Computer	  in	  2007,	  smart	  phones	  have	  
gone	  from	  niche	  specialty	  items	  to	  devices	  carried	  by	  nearly	  50%	  of	  the	  American	  
population.	  	  Smartphones	  have	  expanded	  to	  offer	  similar	  to	  features	  to	  nearly	  all	  of	  
those	  of	  the	  desktop	  computer,	  and	  due	  to	  their	  mobility	  and	  advanced	  sensing	  
devices,	  offer	  a	  number	  of	  abilities	  that	  cannot	  be	  performed	  with	  a	  common	  
personal	  computer.	  	  Smartphones	  make	  up	  40%	  (Nielsen	  Communications,	  2011)	  of	  
the	  current	  market	  for	  mobile	  phones.	  	  An	  overall	  breakdown	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  
illustration	  1	  below.	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Illustration	  1	  (Nielsen	  Communications,	  2011)	  
	  
Even	  more	  compelling,	  62%	  of	  the	  25-­‐34	  year	  old	  market	  own	  and	  use	  smartphones	  
(Nielsen,	  2011),	  showing	  that	  the	  greatest	  saturation	  is	  in	  the	  age	  group	  that	  will	  
continue	  to	  be	  targeted	  consumers	  for	  the	  next	  several	  decades.	  
	  
The	  market	  for	  smartphones,	  in	  the	  past	  year	  has	  become	  largely	  a	  two-­‐company	  
race,	  between	  Android	  and	  iOS.	  	  While	  RIM	  (maker	  of	  Blackberry)	  still	  holds	  a	  
sizeable	  market	  share	  at	  19%,	  their	  trending	  shows	  them	  quickly	  moving	  into	  
irrelevancy,	  losing	  5%	  of	  their	  market	  share	  to	  iOS	  and	  Android	  in	  only	  a	  single	  
quarter	  of	  2011.	  (comScore,	  2011)	  	  Illustration	  2	  shows	  a	  breakdown	  by	  operating	  
system	  the	  market	  share	  of	  smartphone	  devices.	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Illustration	  2	  (comScore,	  2011)	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  smartphone	  space,	  in	  2010,	  the	  tablet	  computer	  device	  finally	  
became	  a	  regularly	  accepted	  form	  factor.	  	  The	  release	  of	  the	  Apple	  iPad,	  soon	  
followed	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  Android	  tablets,	  almost	  immediately	  made	  the	  tablet	  market	  
a	  very	  similar	  2-­‐platform	  race.	  	  A	  study	  released	  by	  Gartner	  in	  2011	  shows	  the	  
market	  being	  largely	  iOS	  dominated,	  but	  with	  the	  gap	  quickly	  closing	  with	  Android,	  
as	  shown	  in	  Illustration	  3.	  (Perez,	  2011)	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Illustration	  3	  (Perez,	  2011)	  
	  
	  
While	  all	  the	  above	  listed	  smartphone	  tablet	  platforms	  share	  common	  
authentication	  mechanisms,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis,	  the	  platforms	  of	  iOS	  
and	  Android	  will	  be	  focused	  on	  due	  to	  their	  majority	  market	  share	  and	  the	  apparent	  
trend	  towards	  market	  domination	  for	  these	  two	  platforms.	  
	  
Smartphones	  and	  tablets	  today	  contain	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  sensors	  and	  technologies	  
that	  make	  them	  incredibly	  powerful	  devices.	  	  Smartphone	  and	  tablet	  devices	  today	  
have	  the	  ability	  to	  store	  our:	  	  
	  
• Contacts	  
• Business	  and	  Personal	  Emails	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• Personal	  Photos	  +	  Videos	  
• Usernames	  and	  Passwords	  
• Social	  Networking	  Identities	  
• Work	  Materials	  –	  Presentations,	  Documents,	  etc	  
• Banking	  Information	  
	  
In	  the	  near	  future,	  there	  will	  be	  heavy	  adoption	  of	  even	  more	  advanced	  features,	  
with	  smartphones	  function	  as:	  
	  
• Car	  Keys	  
• Credit	  Card	  
• House	  Keys	  
	  	  
As	  can	  be	  seen,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life	  can	  be	  stored	  and	  maintained	  on	  a	  
mobile	  device.	  	  These	  devices	  have	  become	  critical	  for	  daily	  business,	  and	  a	  
pervasive	  solution	  for	  consumers.	  	  Securing	  access	  to	  these	  devices	  should	  be	  
considered	  absolutely	  critical,	  on	  both	  the	  business	  and	  consumer	  side	  of	  the	  
market,	  due	  to	  their	  high	  degree	  of	  integration	  with	  critical	  aspects	  of	  the	  user’s	  life.	  
Current	  Mobile	  Authentication	  Mechanisms	  
	  
Current	  mobile	  phone	  authentication	  mechanisms	  on	  Android	  and	  iOS	  give	  few	  
choices.	  	  They	  rely	  on	  memory-­‐based	  pin-­‐numbers,	  passwords,	  or	  pattern	  matching,	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taken	  as	  input	  through	  the	  touchscreen	  of	  the	  device.	  	  All	  systems	  provide	  the	  
minimum	  level	  of	  security	  necessary	  to	  keep	  intruders	  at	  bay,	  however	  suffer	  from	  
some	  weaknesses	  due	  to	  the	  method	  of	  entry.	  
	  
iOS	  
Pin	  Number	  Authentication	  
The	  iOS	  system	  by	  default	  (when	  authentication	  is	  enabled)	  provides	  a	  four	  digit	  
numeric	  pin-­‐code	  challenge	  to	  the	  user	  attempting	  to	  login	  to	  the	  device.	  	  This	  
system	  is	  generally	  on	  par	  with	  overall	  cryptographic	  complexity	  to	  using	  an	  
automated	  teller	  machine	  (ATM).	  	  	  See	  example	  1	  for	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  interface	  
presented	  to	  the	  user.	  
	  
	  
	   12	  
Example	  1	  
	  
Calculating	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  pin	  codes	  is	  a	  trivial	  task,	  as	  the	  user	  must	  have	  4	  
digits,	  selecting	  from	  integers	  0-­‐9.	  	  The	  user	  may	  select	  any	  combination	  of	  
numbers,	  with	  no	  limit	  on	  repetition.	  	  	  The	  user	  may	  not	  insert	  any	  blank	  characters,	  
and	  therefore	  must	  have	  exactly	  4	  integers	  selected.	  	  For	  each	  authentication	  
attempt,	  a	  user	  will	  have	  the	  following	  available	  password	  choices:	  
	  
Input	  1:	  10	  choices	  
Input	  2:	  10	  choices	  
Input	  3:	  10	  choices	  
Input	  4:	  10	  choices	  
	  
Therefore	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  authentication	  codes	  (AC)	  for	  the	  iOS	  pin	  system	  
is:	  
	  	  
AC	  =	  10	  x	  10	  x	  10	  x	  10	  =	  104	  =	  10,000	  	  	  
	  
This	  particular	  system	  is	  widely	  used	  for	  iOS	  authentication	  both	  because	  it	  is	  the	  
default	  security	  option,	  and	  it	  is	  trivial	  to	  input.	  	  	  This	  system	  is	  also	  successful	  due	  
to	  the	  size	  and	  accessibility	  of	  the	  number	  pad,	  allowing	  users	  to	  navigate	  the	  
authentication	  with	  one	  hand,	  or	  even	  without	  looking	  by	  remembering	  the	  basic	  
tap	  pattern	  on	  the	  screen.	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Password	  Authentication	  
The	  iOS	  system	  also	  allows	  for	  standard	  password	  authentication,	  utilizing	  the	  full	  
available	  character	  set	  of	  the	  iOS	  keyboard.	  	  This	  type	  of	  authentication	  needs	  to	  be	  
opted	  into	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  standard	  pin	  code	  authentication.	  	  It	  is	  case	  
sensitive,	  and	  has	  a	  minimum	  of	  1	  character	  length,	  and	  no	  observable	  maximum	  
(up	  to	  40	  characters	  was	  tested).	  	  See	  example	  1	  for	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  interface	  






The	  available	  character	  set	  for	  authentication	  is:	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26	  lowercase	  letters	  
26	  uppercase	  letters	  
10	  integers	  
34	  punctuation	  /	  space	  /	  special	  characters	  
	  
While	  the	  computation	  complexity	  of	  authentication	  via	  this	  mechanism	  can	  be	  
quite	  high	  given	  the	  relatively	  large	  character	  set	  and	  lack	  of	  required	  password	  
lengths,	  there	  are	  no	  requirements	  for	  complexity.	  	  	  Requirements	  such	  as	  
utilization	  of	  an	  uppercase	  letter,	  a	  number,	  punctuation,	  or	  forced	  minimum	  length	  
add	  significant	  complexity	  to	  passwords	  and	  prevent	  users	  from	  creating	  weak	  
passwords.	  	  The	  absence	  of	  any	  of	  these	  requirements	  creates	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  
there	  is	  likely	  possibility	  of	  a	  user	  creating	  a	  trivial	  password.	  	  The	  minimum	  
number	  of	  available	  authentication	  codes	  (AC)	  can	  then	  be	  calculated	  as	  
	  




The	  Android	  pin	  number	  system	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  iOS	  pin	  number	  system.	  	  	  It	  
allows	  the	  user	  a	  choice	  of	  10	  integers	  for	  an	  authentication	  code.	  	  This	  system	  
differs	  from	  the	  iOS	  implementation	  of	  a	  pin	  number	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  limit	  the	  
number	  of	  digits	  to	  use	  in	  the	  pin	  number.	  	  See	  example	  3	  for	  a	  view	  of	  the	  Android	  
pin	  code	  authentication	  system.	  





The	  Android	  system	  enforces	  a	  minimum	  of	  4	  digits,	  however	  a	  user	  may	  choose	  any	  
number	  of	  digits	  to	  use	  for	  authentication.	  	  Effectively,	  this	  allows	  for	  increased	  
security	  over	  the	  iOS	  mechanism	  as	  it	  provides	  an	  additional	  input	  choice	  after	  4	  
characters	  have	  been	  entered.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  selection	  of	  “OK”	  or	  submission	  
of	  the	  pin	  code	  for	  authentication	  becomes	  a	  choice	  besides	  the	  standard	  available	  
integers	  of	  0-­‐9.	  	  While	  the	  overall	  password	  complexity	  can	  be	  increased	  infinitely	  
by	  the	  ability	  to	  extend	  the	  length	  of	  the	  pin	  number	  without	  limit,	  a	  minimum	  
complexity	  can	  be	  obtained	  by	  viewing	  the	  following	  4	  choices:	  
	  
Input	  1:	  10	  choices	  (0-­‐9)	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Input	  2:	  10	  choices	  (0-­‐9)	  
Input	  3:	  10	  choices	  (0-­‐9)	  
Input	  4:	  10	  choices	  (0-­‐9)	  
Input	  5:	  11	  choices	  (0-­‐9	  or	  “OK”,	  indicating	  end	  of	  pin)	  
	  
It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  Android	  approach	  of	  lifting	  the	  limit	  on	  maximum	  digits	  in	  a	  
pin	  number	  creates	  a	  great	  increase	  in	  minimum	  complexity	  of	  passcodes	  over	  the	  
IOS	  system.	  	  The	  minimum	  number	  of	  available	  authentication	  codes	  (AC)	  can	  then	  
be	  calculated	  as	  	  
	  
AC	  =	  10x10x10x10x11	  =	  104	  x	  11	  =	  110,000	  
	  
For	  pin	  numbers	  longer	  than	  4	  characters,	  the	  number	  of	  authentication	  codes	  (AC)	  
increases	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  10	  with	  each	  additional	  digit	  added	  to	  the	  length	  of	  the	  pin.	  	  	  
	  
Password	  	  
The	  Android	  password	  system	  differs	  little	  from	  the	  iOS	  system	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  a	  
user	  to	  select	  a	  password	  of	  their	  choice	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  characters.	  	  The	  only	  
difference	  between	  the	  two	  systems	  is	  the	  forced	  4	  character	  minimum	  limit.	  	  The	  
system	  enforces	  no	  complexity	  requirements	  besides	  minimum	  length.	  	  See	  example	  
4	  for	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  Android	  password	  authentication	  system:	  
	  




26	  lowercase	  characters	  
26	  uppercase	  characters	  
10	  digits	  
35	  punctuation	  /	  space	  /	  special	  characters	  
	  
As	  was	  noted	  with	  iOS	  password	  authentication,	  the	  large	  number	  of	  available	  
characters	  and	  lack	  of	  a	  maximum	  character	  length	  allows	  for	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  
complexity.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Android	  system	  once	  again	  has	  a	  slight	  advantage	  over	  
the	  iOS	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  complexity	  as	  it	  has	  a	  slightly	  larger	  available	  character	  
set,	  and	  it	  requires	  a	  minimum	  of	  4	  characters	  for	  the	  password	  system,	  which	  
forces	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  authentication	  codes	  (AC)	  of	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AC	  =	  (26	  +	  26	  +	  10	  +	  35)4	  =	  974	  	  =	  88,529,281	  
	  
Pattern	  	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  popular	  and	  non-­‐traditional	  available	  authentication	  systems	  is	  the	  
Android	  standard	  pattern	  matching	  challenge.	  	  This	  pattern	  matching	  challenge	  
requires	  that	  a	  user	  must	  swipe	  a	  finger	  over	  a	  set	  of	  nodes	  in	  the	  correct	  order.	  	  
This	  type	  of	  system	  is	  of	  great	  convenience	  to	  the	  user,	  as	  it	  can	  typically	  be	  
performed	  without	  a	  direct	  visual	  connection	  to	  the	  screen,	  as	  the	  pattern	  can	  be	  
easily	  reproduced	  through	  muscle	  memory	  of	  the	  input	  finger.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	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This	  pattern	  system	  follows	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  rules	  (Kaseorg,	  2011)	  
	  
• A	  valid	  pattern	  must	  have	  a	  minimum	  of	  4	  distinct	  nodes	  
• If	  the	  line	  connecting	  any	  two	  consecutive	  nodes	  in	  the	  pattern	  passes	  
through	  any	  other	  nodes,	  those	  other	  nodes	  must	  have	  previously	  been	  in	  the	  
pattern	  	  
• No	  node	  reuse	  is	  permitted	  
	  
An	  object-­‐oriented	  representation	  of	  each	  node’s	  behavior	  was	  created	  to	  illustrate	  
in	  detail	  the	  rules	  as	  they	  are	  enforced	  in	  the	  application,	  available	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  	  
This	  representation	  allows	  each	  instantiated	  node	  to	  report	  back	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  
valid	  candidate,	  when	  supplied	  with	  a	  list	  of	  previously	  selected	  nodes.	  
	  
The	  number	  of	  available	  patterns	  allowed	  under	  these	  rules	  is	  389,112	  (Aviv,	  
Gibson,	  Mossop,	  Blaze,	  &	  Smith,	  2010).	  	  An	  algorithm	  to	  perform	  a	  brute	  force	  
calculation	  of	  the	  available	  patterns	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  2	  (Kaseorg,	  2011).	  	  
This	  places	  the	  overall	  complexity	  of	  the	  challenge	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  a	  4-­‐digit	  pin	  
number,	  but	  less	  than	  that	  of	  the	  full	  password	  approach.	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Issues	  with	  Existing	  Authentication	  Mechanisms	  
Hashing	  Algorithm	  
One	  potential	  downfall	  of	  the	  choice	  to	  make	  an	  operating	  system	  open	  source	  is	  
that	  it	  exposes	  the	  underlying	  code	  to	  scrutiny.	  	  The	  Android	  operating	  system	  is	  
itself	  open	  source.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  underlying	  mechanism	  for	  recording	  the	  lock	  screen	  
pattern	  is	  available	  for	  review.	  	  	  
	  
Contained	  within	  com.android.internal.widget.LockPatternUtils.java	  (Android	  Open	  
Source	  Project)	  is	  the	  source	  code	  that	  manages	  the	  storage	  of	  the	  authentication	  
pattern	  on	  the	  operating	  system.	  	  Through	  analysis	  of	  the	  code,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  
the	  algorithm	  uses	  the	  NIST	  standard	  SHA-­‐1	  (secure	  hashing	  algorithm	  1)	  hashing	  
algorithm.	  	  The	  SHA-­‐1	  algorithm	  creates	  a	  160	  bit	  (40	  character)	  hash	  to	  represent	  
any	  set	  of	  input	  data	  (Secure	  Hash	  Standard,	  1995).	  	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  
SHA-­‐1	  algorithm	  within	  the	  Android	  code	  can	  be	  seen	  within	  appendix	  3,	  with	  
specific	  focus	  on	  lines	  458-­‐483	  (highlighted	  in	  appendix).	  
	  
One	  side	  effect	  of	  this	  information	  being	  freely	  and	  publicly	  available	  is	  that	  it	  raises	  
the	  risk	  of	  compromise.	  	  As	  was	  noted	  previously,	  the	  overall	  available	  key	  space	  for	  
the	  Android	  pattern	  is	  389,112.	  	  With	  such	  a	  relatively	  small	  key	  space,	  and	  a	  known	  
and	  freely	  available	  hash	  and	  storage	  mechanism,	  a	  rainbow	  table	  for	  the	  entire	  key	  
space	  can	  be	  generated	  with	  very	  little	  effort.	  	  The	  general	  Android	  file	  system	  is	  
used	  for	  storage	  of	  the	  pattern	  hash.	  	  As	  such,	  without	  much	  effort,	  the	  pattern	  hash	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can	  be	  recovered	  from	  a	  rooted	  Android	  device,	  and	  looked	  up	  in	  a	  hash	  table	  to	  
recover	  the	  pattern.	  
	  
Android	  assigns	  an	  integer	  value	  to	  each	  node,	  from	  left	  to	  right,	  then	  top	  to	  bottom,	  
numbered	  sequentially	  from	  0-­‐8.	  	  	  
	  
The	  example	  pattern	  contained	  below	  shows	  the	  pattern	  0,1,2,5,4	  
	  
	  
The	  Android	  system	  hashes	  this	  string	  of	  character	  for	  its	  storage.	  
	  
Sha1(0,1,2,5,4)	  =	  061e48faa4a2971109dec3e7b20dd0ee1eab1c06	  
	  
Based	  on	  this	  mechanism,	  a	  device	  may	  have	  its	  pattern	  recovered	  with	  relative	  ease	  
by	  locating	  it	  on	  the	  device	  file	  system.	  




While	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  what	  seem	  to	  be	  complex	  authentication	  mechanisms	  exist	  
for	  mobile	  devices	  today,	  a	  critical	  issue	  hampers	  each	  of	  them.	  	  The	  method	  of	  input	  
for	  these	  authentication	  systems	  is	  through	  a	  capacitive	  touch	  screen	  device.	  	  
Capacitive	  touch	  screens	  calculate	  the	  input	  touch	  point	  by	  discharging	  a	  small	  
current	  of	  electricity	  at	  the	  input	  point,	  meaning	  that	  to	  register	  a	  touch,	  the	  input	  
must	  be	  through	  a	  conductive,	  electrically	  charged	  means,	  such	  as	  a	  human	  finger	  
(Metro).	  	  As	  anyone	  who	  has	  ever	  used	  a	  touch	  screen	  device	  can	  quickly	  tell,	  a	  
human	  finger	  leaves	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  residual	  oil	  behind	  on	  the	  screen	  after	  each	  
touch.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  times	  a	  user	  authenticates	  to	  a	  smart	  phone	  on	  a	  
daily	  basis,	  this	  allows	  for	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  finger	  oil	  residue	  to	  build	  up	  on	  the	  
points	  used	  repeatedly	  for	  authentication.	  	  This	  allows	  for	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  
“Smudge	  Attack”	  (Aviv,	  Gibson,	  Mossop,	  Blaze,	  &	  Smith,	  2010).	  	  This	  attack	  involves	  
the	  inspection	  of	  residual	  smudges	  left	  on	  the	  device	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  
of	  possible	  authentication	  codes.	  	  Aviv	  et	  al	  showed	  that	  by	  minimal	  photographic	  
analysis	  of	  a	  normally	  used	  smartphone,	  a	  92%	  success	  rate	  for	  partial	  pattern	  
recovery	  was	  possible,	  along	  with	  a	  68%	  full	  recovery.	  	  For	  those	  devices	  on	  which	  
only	  a	  partially	  recovered	  pattern	  was	  available,	  a	  high	  success	  rate	  for	  pattern	  
authentication	  can	  be	  obtained	  by	  applying	  basic	  human	  use	  factors.	  	  For	  example,	  
eliminating	  certain	  patterns	  that	  are	  technically	  possibly	  but	  inconvenient,	  
immediately	  cuts	  the	  available	  number	  of	  patterns	  down	  to	  158,410.	  	  Such	  a	  
reduction,	  includes	  the	  30° node	  pattern,	  which	  presents	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	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accidental	  triggering	  of	  non-­‐intended	  nodes.	  	  In	  example	  6	  below,	  this	  type	  of	  
attempt	  is	  illustrated	  as	  a	  pattern	  going	  from	  node	  1	  (upper	  left)	  to	  node	  8,	  has	  a	  






Extending	  the	  Smudge	  Attack	  Logic	  to	  Pin	  Based	  Authentication	  
While	  the	  research	  done	  by	  Aviv,	  et	  al	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  Android	  based	  pattern	  
matching	  authentication	  system,	  similar	  residual	  smudging	  is	  left	  behind	  when	  
using	  pin	  number	  based	  authentication	  systems.	  	  In	  order	  to	  test	  whether	  a	  similar	  
exploit	  was	  possible	  using	  a	  pin-­‐based	  system,	  a	  similar	  test	  was	  run	  on	  a	  first	  
generation	  iPad.	  	  The	  device	  was	  set	  configured	  to	  use	  a	  pin-­‐number	  system,	  and	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was	  used	  submitted	  to	  regular	  use	  for	  a	  day,	  without	  any	  dedicated	  cleaning	  or	  
wiping	  of	  the	  device,	  but	  submitting	  it	  to	  incidental	  contact.	  	  After	  this	  period	  of	  use,	  
the	  device	  was	  mounted	  on	  a	  stand,	  and	  photographed	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  angles	  and	  
at	  a	  variety	  of	  apertures.	  	  The	  device	  was	  side-­‐lit	  by	  a	  handheld	  LED	  microscope	  
light	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  optimal	  angle	  for	  revealing	  residual	  smudges.	  	  The	  device,	  
being	  photographed	  by	  a	  tripod-­‐mounted	  camera,	  was	  also	  photographed	  turned	  
on,	  awaiting	  pin-­‐number	  input,	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  image	  overlay	  analysis	  to	  take	  place.	  
	  
A	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  comparison	  of	  the	  two	  un-­‐manipulated	  photos	  can	  be	  seen	  below	  in	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Example	  7	  	  	   	   	   	   	   Example	  8	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Utilizing	  the	  open	  source	  image	  processing	  software	  called	  Gimp,	  the	  following	  
filters	  were	  applied	  to	  example	  7:	  
	  




Applying	  these	  filters	  along	  with	  a	  close-­‐up	  crop	  of	  the	  image	  allowed	  the	  extraction	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In	  analyzing	  examples	  7	  and	  9,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  deliberate	  input	  of	  single	  pin	  
numbers	  on	  a	  touch	  screen	  devices	  leaves	  a	  different	  signature	  than	  the	  typical	  use	  
patterns	  of	  dedicated	  applications,	  which	  often	  rely	  on	  finger	  swipes.	  	  The	  deliberate	  
pin	  number	  tapping	  process	  left	  clear	  residual	  fingerprints,	  with	  grooves	  and	  
patterns	  clearly	  distinguishable.	  	  	  
	  
Utilizing	  Gimp,	  a	  second	  layer	  was	  created	  over	  top	  of	  example	  7,	  with	  a	  red	  X	  placed	  
in	  each	  noted	  finger	  print	  from	  example	  9,	  to	  create	  the	  following	  image	  in	  example	  





The	  image	  of	  the	  iPad	  was	  then	  removed	  from	  view,	  to	  allow	  the	  red	  X	  fingerprint	  
markers	  to	  remain.	  	  This	  was	  then	  overlaid	  onto	  original	  pin	  number	  login	  screen	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Superimposing	  the	  observed	  fingerprints	  allow	  for	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  
possible	  pin	  numbers	  for	  successful	  authentication	  to	  the	  device.	  
	  
As	  it	  is	  known	  that	  for	  iOS	  pin	  number	  authentication	  the	  pin	  must	  be	  4	  characters,	  
we	  can	  see	  that	  we	  have	  4	  candidates	  to	  choose	  from	  and	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  
number	  of	  possible	  authentication	  codes	  (AC)	  be	  reduced	  as	  such:	  
	  
Input	  1:	  4	  choices	  
Input	  2:	  3	  choices	  
Input	  3:	  2	  choices	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Input	  4:	  1	  choice	  
	  
AC	  =	  4	  x	  3	  x	  2	  x	  1	  =	  24	  
	  
This	  significant	  reduction	  in	  possible	  authentication	  codes	  makes	  unauthorized	  
device	  entry	  a	  trivial	  exercise.	  
	  
Need	  for	  Alternative	  Authentication	  Mechanisms	  
The	  speed	  at	  which	  mobile	  device	  authentication	  mechanisms	  break	  down	  is	  
alarming.	  	  As	  was	  shown	  previously,	  this	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  flawed	  input	  
mechanism	  that	  users	  interact	  with	  the	  device	  through.	  	  Also	  at	  fault	  are	  the	  poorly	  
designed	  authentication	  systems	  themselves.	  	  As	  mobile	  devices	  are	  quickly	  
becoming	  the	  key	  to	  our	  digital	  lives,	  both	  personal	  and	  professional,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  
a	  more	  secure	  yet	  easy	  to	  use	  solution	  needs	  to	  be	  developed.	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Paradigm	   Example	   Common	  Uses	  
















These	  paradigms	  have	  been	  in	  place	  for	  millennia,	  (Singh,	  1999)	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  
pervasive	  in	  all	  restricted-­‐access	  scenarios.	  	  In	  most	  current	  implementations,	  the	  
“something	  you	  have”	  scenario	  requires	  extra	  hardware,	  such	  as	  SecurID	  card	  
readers,	  or	  keychain	  token	  devices	  (RSA,	  2012).	  	  These	  systems	  provide	  a	  strong	  
augmentation	  to	  overall	  security,	  but	  are	  not	  generally	  accepted	  alternatives	  for	  
mobile	  devices,	  as	  the	  form	  factor	  must	  be	  as	  small	  as	  possible,	  and	  dedicated	  
hardware	  technologies	  are	  chosen	  when	  they	  can	  serve	  multiple	  functions.	  	  These	  
systems	  are	  bulky	  and	  generally	  single	  function.	  	  “Something	  you	  are”	  
implementations	  generally	  suffer	  from	  a	  similar	  issue;	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  single	  
function	  piece	  of	  hardware	  dedicated	  to	  authentication	  only.	  
	  
	  With	  current	  mobile	  devices	  however,	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  hardware	  sensing	  
mechanisms	  are	  available	  that	  serve	  a	  variety	  of	  purposes.	  	  These	  mechanisms	  offer	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a	  wide	  variety	  of	  features	  that	  mobile	  users	  have	  become	  dependent	  on,	  such	  as	  
wireless	  networking,	  pictures,	  global	  positioning	  systems,	  and	  device-­‐to-­‐device	  
networking.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  devices,	  if	  applied	  in	  the	  right	  manner,	  could	  serve	  as	  
either	  stand-­‐alone	  or	  secondary	  authentication	  mechanisms.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  devices	  
will	  fit	  into	  our	  traditional	  three-­‐paradigm	  authentication	  set,	  while	  others	  may	  
offer	  the	  opportunity	  for	  expansion	  of	  those	  paradigms.	  
	  
The	  following	  chart	  looks	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  currently	  utilized	  sensing	  (Lane,	  
Miluzzo,	  Lu,	  Peebles,	  Choudhury,	  &	  Campbell,	  2010)	  in	  mobile	  devices,	  as	  well	  as	  
their	  potential	  for	  use	  in	  authentication	  mechanisms:	  
	  
Sensor	  /	   Description	   Authentication	  
Paradigm	  
Example	  
Touchscreen	   Typically	  a	  
capacitive	  
touchscreen	  
system.	  	  Functions	  
by	  sensing	  
electrical	  discharge	  








Camera(s)	   Mobile	  devices	  
generally	  utilize	  1-­‐
2	  cameras,	  either	  
rear	  facing	  or	  front	  
and	  rear	  facing,	  in	  
the	  1-­‐10	  megapixel	  
range.	  
Something	  you	  are	   Facial	  Recognition	  
Expression	  
Recognition	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designed	  to	  help	  
pick	  up	  sound	  and	  
eliminate	  
background	  noise.	  
Something	  you	  are	   Voice	  
Authentication	  
Accelerometer	  	   An	  accelerometer	  
is	  used	  to	  measure	  
acceleration	  and	  is	  
generally	  
employed	  in	  
mobile	  devices	  to	  






Something	  you	  are	   Gait	  Authentication	  
Gyroscope	   A	  	  gyroscope	  is	  
used	  to	  measure	  
orientation	  and	  is	  
generally	  
employed	  in	  
mobile	  devices	  to	  

















and	  longitude,	  and	  
in	  some	  cases	  
altitude,	  speed,	  or	  
other	  metrics	  
about	  location	  and	  
movement.	  
Somewhere	  you	  are	   Location	  
Authentication	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Ambient	  Light	   Ambient	  light	  
sensors	  are	  used	  to	  
detect	  the	  light	  
levels	  around	  the	  
device,	  and	  are	  






None	   None	  
Proximity	   Proximity	  sensors	  
are	  used	  to	  detect	  
nearby	  objects,	  
typically	  the	  
human	  face.	  	  These	  
sensors	  are	  used	  to	  
turn	  off	  the	  
touchscreen	  when	  
the	  device	  is	  
pressed	  against	  the	  
face	  so	  as	  to	  
prevent	  accidental	  
input	  to	  the	  touch	  
screen.	  	  	  
None	   None	  
Compass	   The	  compass	  
system	  is	  similar	  to	  
a	  traditional	  
compass	  in	  that	  it	  
provides	  your	  
overall	  direction	  in	  
terms	  of	  degrees	  
with	  0	  degrees	  
being	  North.	  




communication	  is	  a	  
two-­‐way	  
transmission	  of	  
data	  using	  a	  similar	  
system	  as	  RFID.	  	  It	  
is	  typically	  used	  for	  
very	  short	  range	  
communications,	  
such	  as	  scanning	  a	  
credit	  card	  
None	   None	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Chart	  2	  
	  
The	  less	  well-­‐known	  authentication	  mechanisms	  above,	  such	  as	  expression	  
recognition,	  voice	  authentication,	  and	  gait	  authentication	  mechanisms	  are	  largely	  
based	  on	  academic	  research	  and	  have	  had	  little	  widespread	  implementation	  in	  
consumer	  devices.	  	  	  
	  
Expression	  recognition	  (Essa,	  1997)	  is	  similar	  to	  facial	  recognition,	  but	  rather	  than	  
simply	  analyzing	  a	  static	  image,	  the	  algorithm	  utilizes	  video	  capture	  to	  analyze	  both	  
the	  face	  and	  the	  facial	  expressions.	  	  This	  type	  of	  mechanism	  provides	  an	  added	  layer	  
of	  security	  on	  to	  traditional	  facial	  recognition	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  recently	  
released	  on	  Android	  4.0.	  	  This	  type	  of	  authentication	  seems	  optimal	  as	  it	  requires	  no	  
user	  input.	  	  This	  authentication	  method,	  utilizes	  the	  front	  facing	  camera	  to	  
number.	  
BlueTooth	   BlueTooth	  is	  a	  
wireless	  
microwave	  
frequency	  used	  for	  
short	  range	  
transmission	  of	  
data	  (typically	  up	  
to	  30	  feet),	  and	  is	  
designed	  for	  low	  
power	  
consumption.	  
None	   None	  
802.11x	  /	  WiFi	   802.11x	  is	  a	  
wireless	  
microwave	  
frequency	  used	  for	  
long	  range	  
transmission	  of	  
data	  (typically	  up	  
to	  300	  feet).	  
None	   None	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authenticate	  you	  via	  the	  “something	  you	  are”	  paradigm,	  by	  comparing	  facial	  features	  
between	  a	  trusted	  photo	  and	  the	  current	  image	  sensed	  by	  the	  camera	  (Lu,	  2003).	  	  
While	  a	  novel	  feature,	  it	  took	  only	  a	  short	  amount	  of	  time	  for	  a	  proof	  of	  concept	  
exploit	  to	  appear,	  showing	  that	  the	  technology	  could	  be	  fooled	  by	  a	  simple	  photo	  of	  
the	  person	  shown	  on	  the	  screen	  of	  another	  mobile	  device	  (Murphy,	  2011).	  	  While	  
improvements	  can	  be	  made	  to	  the	  underlying	  authentication	  algorithm,	  such	  as	  
utilizing	  expression	  recognition	  and	  blink	  detection	  (Pan,	  Qu,	  &	  Sun,	  2010),	  it	  
remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  this	  technology	  can	  be	  made	  secure.	  
	  
Voice	  based	  authentication	  systems	  also	  show	  great	  promise.	  	  Voice	  based	  
authentication	  can	  take	  2	  forms	  (Why	  Voice	  Authentication	  is	  the	  Better	  Biometric):	  
	  
• Text	  Dependent	  
• Text	  Independent	  
	  
In	  both	  forms,	  an	  audio	  recording	  or	  “fingerprint”	  of	  the	  users	  voice	  is	  taken	  and	  
stored	  in	  a	  secure	  fashion	  on	  the	  device.	  	  Upon	  authentication,	  the	  user’s	  voice	  is	  
analyzed	  against	  this	  recording,	  and	  an	  analysis	  is	  done	  to	  determine	  if	  it	  is	  the	  same	  
person.	  	  In	  the	  text	  dependent	  form,	  the	  analysis	  is	  done	  on	  a	  predetermined	  and	  
repeated	  phrase.	  	  This	  phrase	  is	  used	  each	  time	  the	  user	  authenticates	  to	  the	  device.	  	  
In	  the	  text	  independent	  form,	  the	  device	  dynamically	  listens	  to	  the	  user’s	  voice	  and	  
picks	  reference	  words.	  	  Upon	  authentication,	  the	  device	  may	  present	  a	  number	  of	  
words	  to	  the	  user	  for	  them	  to	  repeat	  and	  authenticate.	  	  Both	  systems	  are	  potentially	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vulnerable	  to	  the	  “mimic”	  attack,	  that	  of	  someone	  mimicking	  another	  person,	  most	  
likely	  through	  the	  playback	  of	  a	  recording.	  	  The	  text	  independent	  form	  of	  voice	  
authentication	  makes	  the	  mimic	  attack	  slightly	  more	  difficult,	  as	  the	  challenge	  
words	  will	  change	  throughout	  time.	  
	  
Gait	  authentication	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  a	  user’s	  gait	  to	  determine	  who	  they	  are	  
(Gafurov,	  Helkala,	  &	  Søndrol,	  2006).	  	  Gait	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  manner	  of	  walking	  or	  
moving	  on	  foot”.	  	  This	  type	  of	  authentication	  is	  done	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
gyroscope	  and	  accelerometer	  of	  a	  device.	  	  The	  premise	  is	  that	  each	  human	  has	  a	  
unique	  walking	  speed	  and	  pattern	  that	  can	  be	  analyzed	  as	  an	  authentication	  signal.	  	  
While	  this	  type	  of	  solution	  is	  novel,	  the	  process	  of	  authentication	  requires	  the	  user	  
to	  be	  in	  motion	  on	  foot	  –	  not	  within	  the	  typical	  use	  case	  of	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  
users,	  typically	  seated	  at	  a	  desk	  during	  the	  day,	  or	  using	  their	  mobile	  device	  in	  a	  car.	  	  	  
Improved	  Authentication	  Mechanisms	  
Based	  on	  the	  testing	  and	  research	  performed	  above,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  
for	  improved	  authentication	  mechanisms.	  	  It	  is	  a	  challenging	  topic,	  as	  it	  not	  only	  has	  
to	  take	  into	  account	  overall	  security,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  usable	  enough	  that	  it	  does	  not	  
alienate	  the	  user	  or	  distract	  them	  too	  much	  from	  their	  daily	  lives.	  	  	  
	  
Three	  solutions	  are	  thus	  proposed	  below;	  the	  first	  is	  a	  proposal	  for	  a	  new	  
authentication	  system	  based	  on	  newly	  available	  sensing	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  latter	  
2	  are	  improvements	  to	  the	  most	  popular	  existing	  authentication	  mechanisms.	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Improvement	  1:	  Somewhere	  You	  Are	  –	  A	  New	  Authentication	  Paradigm	  
In	  the	  analysis	  done	  in	  chart	  2,	  one	  particular	  scheme	  is	  proposed	  that	  has	  seen	  little	  
previous	  discussion.	  	  This	  is	  the	  use	  of	  a	  mobile	  device’s	  global	  positioning	  system	  
(or	  combination	  of	  WiFi	  and	  Cellular	  signals)	  to	  authenticate	  a	  user	  based	  on	  where	  
they	  are.	  	  This	  type	  of	  solution	  would	  allow	  a	  user	  to	  remain	  authenticated	  when	  
they	  are	  in	  “safe	  zones”,	  such	  as	  their	  home	  or	  their	  office.	  	  This	  would	  effectively	  
allow	  a	  user	  to	  bypass	  all	  authentication	  mechanisms	  when	  located	  within	  a	  “safe	  
zone”,	  or	  an	  area	  where	  the	  user	  has	  explicitly	  whitelisted	  the	  area,	  as	  presumably	  
mitigating	  controls	  are	  in	  place,	  such	  as	  physical	  security.	  
	  
To	  extend	  this	  functionality,	  the	  Bluetooth	  communication	  protocol	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
add	  “safe	  device	  zones”.	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  “safe	  device	  zone”	  is	  a	  user’s	  car.	  	  The	  
mobile	  device	  and	  car	  create	  a	  pairing	  based	  on	  the	  previously	  approved	  Bluetooth	  
protocol.	  	  The	  Bluetooth	  transceiver	  within	  the	  car	  has	  a	  unique	  MAC	  address	  that	  
can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  authentication	  key,	  so	  the	  device	  would	  enforce	  no	  authentication	  
challenge	  to	  the	  user	  while	  that	  user	  is	  paired	  with	  their	  car’s	  Bluetooth	  system.	  	  
	  
These	  solutions	  would	  allow	  a	  user	  to	  use	  the	  device	  unencumbered	  by	  
authentication	  requests	  when	  in	  trusted	  scenarios.	  	  	  
	  
The	  obvious	  question	  is,	  how	  does	  bypassing	  authentication	  challenges	  improve	  
security?	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Real-­‐world	  effectiveness	  of	  security	  is	  a	  constant	  balance	  between	  usability	  and	  
cryptographic	  strength.	  	  If	  designation	  of	  “safe	  zones”	  allows	  a	  user	  to	  significantly	  
reduce	  their	  daily	  authentication	  efforts,	  then	  that	  same	  user	  will	  be	  far	  more	  likely	  
to	  tolerate	  a	  stronger	  	  (and	  less	  convenient)	  authentication	  system	  when	  they	  are	  
not	  within	  a	  “safe	  zone”,	  as	  these	  events	  will	  likely	  be	  in	  the	  minority	  of	  
authentication	  events	  throughout	  the	  day.	  
	  
While	  this	  example	  suggests	  placement	  within	  a	  “safe	  zone”	  would	  allow	  a	  total	  
bypass	  of	  authentication	  protocol,	  it	  is	  just	  as	  feasible	  to	  force	  a	  very	  lightweight	  
authentication	  system	  in	  these	  scenarios	  (such	  as	  the	  Android	  pattern	  match),	  with	  
a	  more	  robust	  system	  when	  located	  outside	  as	  a	  “safe	  zone”.	  
	  
This	  type	  of	  authentication	  system,	  if	  implemented,	  would	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  traditional	  
three	  authentication	  paradigms	  of	  something	  you	  have,	  something	  you	  know,	  and	  
something	  you	  are.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  a	  new	  paradigm	  is	  proposed;	  somewhere	  you	  
are.	  	  This	  paradigm	  would	  utilize	  location	  based	  data,	  typically	  sensed	  through	  a	  GPS	  
mechanism	  (or	  could	  alternatively	  be	  done	  through	  802.11x	  /	  WiFi	  	  or	  cellular	  
triangulation	  in	  certain	  areas),	  to	  identify	  “safe	  zones”	  where	  authentication	  is	  not	  
required,	  or	  could	  be	  of	  a	  less	  robust	  nature.	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Improvement	  2:	  Forced	  Rotation	  and	  Movement	  
The	  authentication	  mechanisms	  outlined	  in	  examples	  1-­‐5	  above	  show	  systems	  that	  
are	  not	  particularly	  strong,	  but	  in	  theory	  provide	  enough	  of	  a	  challenge	  to	  deter	  the	  
casual	  infiltrator.	  	  However,	  with	  the	  “smudge”	  attack	  method	  outlined	  later	  on,	  the	  
overall	  security	  of	  these	  systems	  breaks	  down	  very	  quickly.	  	  One	  simple	  to	  
implement	  method	  to	  thwart	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  “smudge”	  attack	  is	  through	  forced	  
rotation	  and	  movement	  of	  the	  login	  screen.	  	  	  
	  
The	  following	  mockups	  show	  an	  implementation	  of	  the	  pin	  number,	  password,	  and	  
pattern	  authentication	  systems,	  along	  with	  3	  variations,	  that	  would	  be	  forced	  and	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Note	  that	  in	  example	  14,	  a	  reference	  point	  is	  required	  to	  ensure	  the	  user	  inputs	  the	  
pattern	  from	  the	  proper	  orientation.	  	  In	  the	  example,	  the	  padlock	  icon	  was	  used	  as	  
that	  reference	  point.	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  forced	  rotation	  and	  movement	  of	  input	  points	  would	  allow	  for	  significant	  
obfuscation	  of	  smudge	  points,	  reducing	  the	  ability	  for	  a	  smudge	  attack	  to	  be	  
effective.	  	  The	  forced	  movement	  and	  rotation	  would	  create	  overlapping	  and	  
intersecting	  smudges,	  as	  well	  as	  less	  smudge	  buildup	  in	  distinct	  areas	  of	  the	  
touchscreen.	  	  	  
	  
Weaknesses	  
Some	  weaknesses	  with	  this	  method	  do	  exist.	  	  The	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  
rotation	  and	  movement	  mechanism	  is	  increased	  as	  the	  number	  of	  authentication	  
attempts	  since	  a	  full	  cleaning	  increases.	  	  This	  relies	  on	  obfuscation	  of	  the	  true	  unlock	  
pattern	  through	  buildup	  of	  finger	  oil	  on	  the	  screen.	  	  While	  this	  may	  be	  effective,	  the	  
most	  recent	  unlock	  pattern	  will	  generally	  be	  most	  visible	  as	  the	  most	  recent	  unlock	  
layer.	  	  If	  the	  pattern	  shape	  can	  be	  retrieved,	  the	  number	  of	  guesses	  needed	  to	  apply	  
that	  pattern	  on	  the	  right	  set	  of	  nodes	  (tested	  horizontally	  and	  vertically)	  may	  be	  
small	  enough	  to	  make	  this	  authentication	  system	  similarly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  systems	  
previously	  reviewed.	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Improvement	  3:	  Dynamic	  Patterns	  
The	  core	  issue	  with	  pattern-­‐based	  systems	  is	  the	  excessive	  residue	  left	  behind	  on	  
the	  touchscreen.	  	  A	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  ensure	  a	  different	  pattern	  is	  





This	  pattern	  matching	  system	  requires	  assigns	  a	  unique	  color	  to	  each	  node,	  and	  
randomizes	  the	  order	  of	  the	  nodes	  on	  each	  login	  attempt.	  	  This	  mechanism	  requires	  
the	  removal	  of	  the	  center	  node,	  as	  a	  user	  must	  be	  able	  to	  access	  each	  node	  from	  any	  
point	  on	  the	  screen.	  	  This	  has	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  overall	  complexity,	  as	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  a	  center	  node	  (in	  the	  current	  pattern	  system)	  that	  blocks	  possible	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pattern	  variations	  also	  reduces	  overall	  complexity.	  	  By	  arranging	  the	  available	  nodes	  
in	  a	  circle	  with	  no	  central	  blocking	  node,	  we	  can	  also	  allow	  reuse	  of	  nodes,	  which	  
will	  significantly	  increase	  the	  overall	  keyspace.	  
	  
	  In	  order	  to	  authenticate,	  the	  user	  would	  remember	  their	  color	  pattern.	  	  For	  
example,	  to	  authenticate	  to	  the	  variations	  in	  example	  15	  with	  the	  passcode	  of	  Red,	  





It	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  this	  example	  that	  the	  overall	  smudge	  lines	  would	  be	  useless	  for	  
an	  attacker	  trying	  to	  force	  authentication.	  	  This	  system	  would	  actually	  increase	  the	  
overall	  number	  of	  available	  authentication	  patterns.	  	  Recall	  the	  standard	  Android	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pattern	  authentication	  system	  has	  389,112	  possible	  patterns,	  with	  half	  of	  those	  
being	  technically	  possible	  but	  unlikely	  and	  highly	  prone	  to	  entry	  error.	  	  This	  brings	  
the	  overall	  use	  number	  of	  authentication	  patterns	  down	  to	  158,410.	  	  	  
	  
To	  summarize	  the	  rules	  for	  this	  system:	  
-­‐ Patterns	  must	  be	  a	  minimum	  of	  4	  nodes	  and	  a	  maximum	  of	  8	  nodes	  
-­‐ Nodes	  may	  be	  visited	  any	  number	  of	  times;	  however	  no	  node	  may	  be	  visited	  
twice	  consecutively	  
	  
To	  calculate	  the	  overall	  complexity	  of	  this	  pattern,	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  
factorializing	  the	  number	  of	  distinct	  nodes.	  	  For	  the	  example	  above,	  with	  8	  nodes,	  
the	  number	  of	  authentication	  patterns	  is:	  
AC	  =	  Number	  of	  Nodes	  *	  (Number	  of	  nodes	  -­‐1)pattern	  length	  -­‐1	  	  
AC	  for	  4	  Digits	  =	  8*7*7*7	  =	  8	  *	  73	  	  =	  2,744	  
AC	  for	  5	  Digits	  =	  8*7*7*7*7	  =	  8	  *	  74	  	  =	  19,208	  	  
AC	  for	  6	  Digits	  =	  	  8*7*7*7*7*7	  =	  8	  *	  75	  	  =	  134,456	  	  
AC	  for	  7	  Digits	  =	  8*7*7*7*7*7*7	  =	  8	  *	  76	  	  =	  941,192	  
AC	  for	  8	  Digits	  =	  8*7*7*7*7*7*7*7	  =	  8	  *	  77	  	  =	  6,588,344	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Increasing	  the	  total	  number	  of	  nodes	  to	  9	  creates	  an	  even	  stronger	  system:	  
	  
AC	  for	  4	  Digits	  =	  9*8*8*8	  =	  9	  *	  83	  	  =	  4,608	  
AC	  for	  5	  Digits	  =	  9*8*8*8*8	  =	  9	  *	  84	  	  =	  36,864	  	  
AC	  for	  6	  Digits	  =	  	  9*8*8*8*8*8	  =	  9	  *	  85	  	  =	  294,912	  	  
AC	  for	  7	  Digits	  =	  9*8*8*8*8*8*8	  =	  9	  *	  86	  	  =	  2,359,296	  
AC	  for	  8	  Digits	  =	  9*8*8*8*8*8*8*8	  =	  9	  *	  87	  	  =	  18,874,368	  
AC	  for	  9	  Digits	  =	  9*8*8*8*8*8*8*8*8	  =	  9	  *	  88	  	  =	  150,994,944	  
Sum	  of	  authentication	  patterns	  for	  this	  system:	  	  172,564,992	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  demonstrated,	  this	  alternative	  system	  retains	  a	  similar	  overall	  ease	  of	  
use	  swipe	  mechanism,	  but	  increases	  the	  available	  key	  space	  by	  over	  4000%	  from	  
that	  of	  the	  existing	  pattern	  matching	  mechanism.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  mobile	  device	  landscape	  is	  expanding	  at	  a	  great	  pace.	  	  Smart	  phones	  are	  quickly	  
approaching	  a	  50%	  stake	  in	  the	  phone	  market,	  while	  tablet	  computers	  have	  finally	  
emerged	  as	  a	  distinct	  and	  robust	  market.	  	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  e-­‐readers,	  an	  “in-­‐
between”	  device	  market	  has	  evolved.	  	  These	  devices	  are	  aggressively	  pursuing	  
becoming	  the	  do-­‐it-­‐all	  device	  that	  not	  only	  replaces	  the	  desktop	  computer,	  but	  also	  
serves	  as	  the	  main	  interface	  to	  everyday	  life	  tasks	  such	  as	  banking,	  driving,	  
communication,	  shopping,	  and	  more.	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Authentication	  methods	  on	  these	  devices	  almost	  universally	  rely	  on	  touchscreen	  
input	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  schemes,	  ranging	  from	  4	  digit	  pin	  numbers	  to	  authentication	  
patterns,	  to	  passwords.	  	  These	  systems	  provide	  a	  minimal	  level	  of	  security	  for	  the	  
user.	  	  While	  there	  is	  a	  constant	  tradeoff	  between	  ease	  of	  authentication	  and	  
cryptographic	  complexity,	  the	  pervasive	  use	  of	  a	  touchscreen	  as	  the	  main	  input	  
method	  causes	  a	  number	  of	  issues.	  	  Most	  significantly,	  the	  touchscreen	  mechanism	  
is	  prone	  to	  forming	  a	  buildup	  of	  smudges	  left	  by	  the	  user’s	  fingers.	  	  These	  smudges	  
appear	  most	  prominently	  in	  areas	  of	  the	  screen	  where	  there	  is	  the	  most	  activity;	  the	  
authentication	  pattern	  is	  naturally	  one	  of	  the	  most	  active	  areas	  on	  the	  touchscreen,	  
so	  it	  is	  very	  common	  for	  a	  significant	  smudge	  build	  up	  to	  occur	  in	  this	  area,	  giving	  
the	  attacker	  a	  very	  easy	  to	  reproduce	  path	  to	  authentication.	  	  While	  this	  is	  most	  
easily	  exploitable	  using	  the	  Android	  pattern	  matching	  system,	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  
attack	  is	  reproducible	  for	  a	  basic	  pin	  number	  system,	  allowing	  a	  significant	  
reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  authentication	  pins.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  an	  improvement	  is	  needed	  in	  the	  area	  of	  mobile	  device	  authentication	  
schemes.	  	  Traditionally,	  the	  three	  factors	  of	  authentication	  have	  been	  something	  you	  
know,	  something	  you	  have,	  and	  something	  you	  are.	  	  With	  the	  wide	  array	  of	  sensors	  
available	  in	  mobile	  devices,	  new	  and	  potentially	  usable	  information	  is	  being	  
collected	  about	  users	  and	  their	  surroundings	  that	  could	  be	  utilized	  for	  
authentication.	  	  To	  demonstrate	  this,	  a	  fourth	  authentication	  factor	  was	  proposed,	  
somewhere	  you	  are,	  that	  utilizes	  the	  GPS	  sensor	  information	  to	  identify	  safe-­‐zones	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for	  authentication	  bypass,	  with	  the	  supposition	  that	  decreased	  security	  in	  certain	  
situations	  would	  make	  the	  user	  more	  accepting	  of	  stronger	  authentication	  
mechanisms	  in	  cases	  where	  location	  cannot	  be	  considered	  secure.	  	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  using	  new	  sensor	  mechanisms	  for	  authentication,	  improvements	  can	  
be	  made	  to	  existing	  systems	  to	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  the	  chance	  of	  a	  smudge	  attack.	  	  
By	  dynamically	  placing	  the	  authentication	  puzzle	  on	  the	  touchscreen,	  through	  X-­‐Y	  
axis	  manipulation	  as	  well	  as	  rotation,	  any	  smudges	  left	  will	  be	  in	  different	  spots	  each	  
time.	  	  The	  downfall	  of	  this	  system	  is	  that	  distances	  and	  proportions	  between	  taps	  or	  
swipes	  can	  still	  be	  retained,	  giving	  an	  attack	  a	  bit	  of	  useful	  information	  about	  the	  
authentication	  key.	  	  As	  an	  additional	  improvement	  to	  this	  system,	  an	  alternative	  
pattern	  puzzle	  was	  proposed	  that	  replaces	  the	  standard	  node	  pattern	  with	  a	  node	  
coloring	  scheme.	  	  This	  node	  coloring	  scheme	  allows	  for	  random	  placement	  of	  
colored	  nodes	  on	  screen,	  with	  a	  standard	  color	  pattern	  used	  as	  an	  authentication	  
key.	  	  This	  system	  ensures	  a	  different	  smudge	  pattern	  left	  on	  screen	  each	  time,	  while	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  significantly	  increasing	  the	  overall	  available	  key	  space	  over	  the	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Appendices	  
	  
Appendix	  1	  –	  Node	  Object	  Definition	  
	  
 1 <?php
 2 class Node {
 3  
 4 function Node($number){  //CONSTRUCTOR
 5  
 6 // Set this nodes number
 7 $this->position = $number;
 8  




13     $this->currentpos = end($currentpattern);
14  
15     if (in_array($this->position, $currentpattern))
16     {
17         // If current node already exists in pattern, return false
18         return false;
19     }
20  
21     // Center Node
22     if ($this->position == 4)
23     {
24         // Rules for center node
25         // available from all spots anytime, assuming it hasn't been used
26         // which is checked previously
27         return true;
28     }
29  
30     // Side Nodes - Vertical
31     if (($this->currentpos == 1 && $this->position == 7) || $this->currentpos == 7 &&
$this->position == 1)
32     {
33         // If moving from node 1 to 7, node 4 must have been visited, else false
34         if (in_array(4, $currentpattern))
35         {
36                 return true;
37         }
38         else {
39              return false;
40         }
41     }
42  
43     // Side Nodes - Horizontal
44     if (($this->currentpos == 3 && $this->position == 5) || $this->currentpos == 5 &&
$this->position == 3)
45     {
46         // If moving from node 1 to 7, node 4 must have been visited, else false
47         if (in_array(4, $currentpattern))
48         {
49              return true;
50         }
51         else {
52              return false;
53         }
54     }
55  
56     // Corner Nodes - if coming from other corner node
57     if (($this->position == 0 || $this->position == 2 || $this->position == 6 ||
$this->position == 8) &&
58               ($this->currentpos == 0 || $this->currentpos == 2 || $this->currentpos == 6 ||
$this->currentpos == 8))
59     {
60         // Rules for corner nodes
61         // If traversing from other corner node
62         // currentpos node + this node divided by 2 must be traversed
63         // Example - going from 0->2 requires 1 already visited (0+2 = 2, 2/2 = 1)_
64         // Example - going from 6->2 required 4 already visited (6+2 = 8, 8/2 = 4)
65  
66         $midpoint = ($this->position + $this->currentpos) / 2;
67         if(in_array($midpoint, $currentpattern))
68                 {
69              return true;
70         }
71         else {
72             return false;
73         }
74     }
75     // if we made it this far, we've passed all blacklist conditions
76     return true;
77 } // end isavailable method
78  
79 } // end class
80 ?>









 2 class Node {
 3  
 4 function Node($number){  //CONSTRUCTOR
 5  
 6 // Set this nodes number
 7 $this->position = $number;
 8  




13     $this->currentpos = end($currentpattern);
14  
15     if (in_array($this->position, $currentpattern))
16     {
17         // If current node already exists in pattern, return false
18         return false;
19     }
20  
21     // Center Node
22     if ($this->position == 4)
23     {
24         // Rules for center node
25         // available from all spots anytime, assuming it hasn't been used
26         // which is checked previously
27         return true;
28     }
29  
30     // Side Nodes - Vertical
31     if (($this->currentpos == 1 && $this->position == 7) || $this->currentpos == 7 &&
$this->position == 1)
32     {
33         // If moving from node 1 to 7, node 4 must have been visited, else false
34         if (in_array(4, $currentpattern))
35         {
36                 return true;
37         }
38         else {
39              return false;
40         }
41     }
42  
43     // Side Nodes - Horizontal
44     if (($this->currentpos == 3 && $this->position == 5) || $this->currentpos == 5 &&
$this->position == 3)
45     {
46         // If moving from node 1 to 7, node 4 must have been visited, else false
47         if (in_array(4, $currentpattern))
48         {
49              return true;
50         }
51         else {
52              return false;
53         }
54     }
55  
56     // Corner Nodes - if coming from other corner node
57     if (($this->position == 0 || $this->position == 2 || $this->position == 6 ||
$this->position == 8) &&
58               ($this->currentpos == 0 || $this->currentpos == 2 || $this->currentpos == 6 ||
$this->currentpos == 8))
59     {
60         // Rules for corner nodes
61         // If traversing from other corner node
62         // currentpos node + this node divided by 2 must be traversed
63         // Example - going from 0->2 requires 1 already visited (0+2 = 2, 2/2 = 1)_
64         // Example - going from 6->2 required 4 already visited (6+2 = 8, 8/2 = 4)
65  
66         $midpoint = ($this->position + $this->currentpos) / 2;
67         if(in_array($midpoint, $currentpattern))
68                 {
69              return true;
70         }
71         else {
72             return false;
73         }
74     }
75     // if we made it this far, we've passed all blacklist conditions
76     return true;
77 } // end isavailable method
78  
79 } // end class
80 ?>
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Appendix	  2	  –	  Android	  Pattern	  Count	  –	  Brute	  Force	  (Haskell)	  (Kaseorg,	  2011)	  
	  
dots	  =	  [(row,	  col)	  |	  row	  <-­‐	  [0..2],	  col	  <-­‐	  [0..2]]	  
line	  (r,	  c)	  (r',	  c')	  =	  takeWhile	  (/=	  (r',	  c'))	  $	  
	  	  zip	  [r,	  r	  +	  div	  (r'	  -­‐	  r)	  g	  ..]	  [c,	  c	  +	  div	  (c'	  -­‐	  c)	  g	  ..]	  
	  	  	  	  where	  g	  =	  gcd	  (r'	  -­‐	  r)	  (c'	  -­‐	  c)	  
extensions	  pattern@(dot	  :	  _)	  =	  
	  	  [new	  :	  pattern	  |	  new	  <-­‐	  dots,	  
	  	  	  not	  $	  new	  `elem`	  pattern,	  all	  (`elem`	  pattern)	  $	  line	  dot	  new]	  
search	  pattern	  found	  =	  foldr	  search	  (pattern	  :	  found)	  $	  extensions	  pattern	  
valid	  pattern	  =	  length	  pattern	  >=	  4	  
main	  =	  print	  .	  length	  .	  filter	  valid	  .	  foldr	  search	  []	  $	  map	  (:	  [])	  dots	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Appendix	  3	  –	  LockPatternUtils.java	  
	  
/* 
 * Copyright (C) 2007 The Android Open Source Project 
 * 
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); 
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. 
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at 
 * 
 *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 
 * 
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software 
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, 
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. 
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and 










































 * Utilities for the lock patten and its settings. 
 */ 
public class LockPatternUtils { 
 
    private static final String TAG = "LockPatternUtils"; 
 
    private static final String SYSTEM_DIRECTORY = "/system/"; 
    private static final String LOCK_PATTERN_FILE = "gesture.key"; 
    private static final String LOCK_PASSWORD_FILE = "password.key"; 
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    /** 
     * The maximum number of incorrect attempts before the user is prevented 
     * from trying again for {@link #FAILED_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS}. 
     */ 
    public static final int FAILED_ATTEMPTS_BEFORE_TIMEOUT = 5; 
 
    /** 
     * The number of incorrect attempts before which we fall back on an alternative 
     * method of verifying the user, and resetting their lock pattern. 
     */ 
    public static final int FAILED_ATTEMPTS_BEFORE_RESET = 20; 
 
    /** 
     * How long the user is prevented from trying again after entering the 
     * wrong pattern too many times. 
     */ 
    public static final long FAILED_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000L; 
 
    /** 
     * The interval of the countdown for showing progress of the lockout. 
     */ 
    public static final long FAILED_ATTEMPT_COUNTDOWN_INTERVAL_MS = 1000L; 
 
    /** 
     * The minimum number of dots in a valid pattern. 
     */ 
    public static final int MIN_LOCK_PATTERN_SIZE = 4; 
 
    /** 
     * The minimum number of dots the user must include in a wrong pattern 
     * attempt for it to be counted against the counts that affect 
     * {@link #FAILED_ATTEMPTS_BEFORE_TIMEOUT} and {@link #FAILED_ATTEMPTS_BEFORE_RESET} 
     */ 
    public static final int MIN_PATTERN_REGISTER_FAIL = 3; 
 
    private final static String LOCKOUT_PERMANENT_KEY = 
"lockscreen.lockedoutpermanently"; 
    private final static String LOCKOUT_ATTEMPT_DEADLINE = 
"lockscreen.lockoutattemptdeadline"; 
    private final static String PATTERN_EVER_CHOSEN_KEY = "lockscreen.patterneverchosen"; 
    public final static String PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY = "lockscreen.password_type"; 
    private final static String LOCK_PASSWORD_SALT_KEY = "lockscreen.password_salt"; 
 
    private final Context mContext; 
    private final ContentResolver mContentResolver; 
    private DevicePolicyManager mDevicePolicyManager; 
    private static String sLockPatternFilename; 
    private static String sLockPasswordFilename; 
 
    private static final AtomicBoolean sHaveNonZeroPatternFile = new 
AtomicBoolean(false); 
    private static final AtomicBoolean sHaveNonZeroPasswordFile = new 
AtomicBoolean(false); 
    private static FileObserver sPasswordObserver; 
 
    public DevicePolicyManager getDevicePolicyManager() { 
        if (mDevicePolicyManager == null) { 
            mDevicePolicyManager = 
                
(DevicePolicyManager)mContext.getSystemService(Context.DEVICE_POLICY_SERVICE); 
            if (mDevicePolicyManager == null) { 
                Log.e(TAG, "Can't get DevicePolicyManagerService: is it running?", 
                        new IllegalStateException("Stack trace:")); 
            } 
        } 
        return mDevicePolicyManager; 
    } 
    /** 
     * @param contentResolver Used to look up and save settings. 
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     */ 
    public LockPatternUtils(Context context) { 
        mContext = context; 
        mContentResolver = context.getContentResolver(); 
 
        // Initialize the location of gesture & PIN lock files 
        if (sLockPatternFilename == null) { 
            String dataSystemDirectory = 
                    android.os.Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + 
                    SYSTEM_DIRECTORY; 
            sLockPatternFilename =  dataSystemDirectory + LOCK_PATTERN_FILE; 
            sLockPasswordFilename = dataSystemDirectory + LOCK_PASSWORD_FILE; 
            sHaveNonZeroPatternFile.set(new File(sLockPatternFilename).length() > 0); 
            sHaveNonZeroPasswordFile.set(new File(sLockPasswordFilename).length() > 0); 
            int fileObserverMask = FileObserver.CLOSE_WRITE | FileObserver.DELETE | 
                    FileObserver.MOVED_TO | FileObserver.CREATE; 
            sPasswordObserver = new FileObserver(dataSystemDirectory, fileObserverMask) { 
                    public void onEvent(int event, String path) { 
                        if (LOCK_PATTERN_FILE.equals(path)) { 
                            Log.d(TAG, "lock pattern file changed"); 
                            sHaveNonZeroPatternFile.set(new 
File(sLockPatternFilename).length() > 0); 
                        } else if (LOCK_PASSWORD_FILE.equals(path)) { 
                            Log.d(TAG, "lock password file changed"); 
                            sHaveNonZeroPasswordFile.set(new 
File(sLockPasswordFilename).length() > 0); 
                        } 
                    } 
                }; 
            sPasswordObserver.startWatching(); 
        } 
    } 
 
    public int getRequestedMinimumPasswordLength() { 
        return getDevicePolicyManager().getPasswordMinimumLength(null); 
    } 
 
 
    /** 
     * Gets the device policy password mode. If the mode is non-specific, returns 
     * MODE_PATTERN which allows the user to choose anything. 
     */ 
    public int getRequestedPasswordQuality() { 
        return getDevicePolicyManager().getPasswordQuality(null); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Returns the actual password mode, as set by keyguard after updating the password. 
     * 
     * @return 
     */ 
    public void reportFailedPasswordAttempt() { 
        getDevicePolicyManager().reportFailedPasswordAttempt(); 
    } 
 
    public void reportSuccessfulPasswordAttempt() { 
        getDevicePolicyManager().reportSuccessfulPasswordAttempt(); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Check to see if a pattern matches the saved pattern.  If no pattern exists, 
     * always returns true. 
     * @param pattern The pattern to check. 
     * @return Whether the pattern matches the stored one. 
     */ 
    public boolean checkPattern(List<LockPatternView.Cell> pattern) { 
        try { 
            // Read all the bytes from the file 
            RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(sLockPatternFilename, "r"); 
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            final byte[] stored = new byte[(int) raf.length()]; 
            int got = raf.read(stored, 0, stored.length); 
            raf.close(); 
            if (got <= 0) { 
                return true; 
            } 
            // Compare the hash from the file with the entered pattern's hash 
            return Arrays.equals(stored, LockPatternUtils.patternToHash(pattern)); 
        } catch (FileNotFoundException fnfe) { 
            return true; 
        } catch (IOException ioe) { 
            return true; 
        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Check to see if a password matches the saved password.  If no password exists, 
     * always returns true. 
     * @param password The password to check. 
     * @return Whether the password matches the stored one. 
     */ 
    public boolean checkPassword(String password) { 
        try { 
            // Read all the bytes from the file 
            RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(sLockPasswordFilename, "r"); 
            final byte[] stored = new byte[(int) raf.length()]; 
            int got = raf.read(stored, 0, stored.length); 
            raf.close(); 
            if (got <= 0) { 
                return true; 
            } 
            // Compare the hash from the file with the entered password's hash 
            return Arrays.equals(stored, passwordToHash(password)); 
        } catch (FileNotFoundException fnfe) { 
            return true; 
        } catch (IOException ioe) { 
            return true; 
        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Check to see if the user has stored a lock pattern. 
     * @return Whether a saved pattern exists. 
     */ 
    public boolean savedPatternExists() { 
        return sHaveNonZeroPatternFile.get(); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Check to see if the user has stored a lock pattern. 
     * @return Whether a saved pattern exists. 
     */ 
    public boolean savedPasswordExists() { 
        return sHaveNonZeroPasswordFile.get(); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Return true if the user has ever chosen a pattern.  This is true even if the 
pattern is 
     * currently cleared. 
     * 
     * @return True if the user has ever chosen a pattern. 
     */ 
    public boolean isPatternEverChosen() { 
        return getBoolean(PATTERN_EVER_CHOSEN_KEY); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Used by device policy manager to validate the current password 
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     * information it has. 
     */ 
    public int getActivePasswordQuality() { 
        int activePasswordQuality = DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED; 
        switch (getKeyguardStoredPasswordQuality()) { 
            case DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING: 
                if (isLockPatternEnabled()) { 
                    activePasswordQuality = 
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING; 
                } 
                break; 
            case DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_NUMERIC: 
                if (isLockPasswordEnabled()) { 
                    activePasswordQuality = DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_NUMERIC; 
                } 
                break; 
            case DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHABETIC: 
                if (isLockPasswordEnabled()) { 
                    activePasswordQuality = 
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHABETIC; 
                } 
                break; 
            case DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHANUMERIC: 
                if (isLockPasswordEnabled()) { 
                    activePasswordQuality = 
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHANUMERIC; 
                } 
                break; 
        } 
        return activePasswordQuality; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Clear any lock pattern or password. 
     */ 
    public void clearLock() { 
        getDevicePolicyManager().setActivePasswordState( 
                DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED, 0); 
        saveLockPassword(null, DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING); 
        setLockPatternEnabled(false); 
        saveLockPattern(null); 
        setLong(PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Save a lock pattern. 
     * @param pattern The new pattern to save. 
     */ 
    public void saveLockPattern(List<LockPatternView.Cell> pattern) { 
        // Compute the hash 
        final byte[] hash  = LockPatternUtils.patternToHash(pattern); 
        try { 
            // Write the hash to file 
            RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(sLockPatternFilename, "rw"); 
            // Truncate the file if pattern is null, to clear the lock 
            if (pattern == null) { 
                raf.setLength(0); 
            } else { 
                raf.write(hash, 0, hash.length); 
            } 
            raf.close(); 
            DevicePolicyManager dpm = getDevicePolicyManager(); 
            if (pattern != null) { 
                setBoolean(PATTERN_EVER_CHOSEN_KEY, true); 
                setLong(PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, 
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING); 
                dpm.setActivePasswordState( 
                        DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING, pattern.size()); 
            } else { 
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                dpm.setActivePasswordState( 
                        DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED, 0); 
            } 
        } catch (FileNotFoundException fnfe) { 
            // Cant do much, unless we want to fail over to using the settings provider 
            Log.e(TAG, "Unable to save lock pattern to " + sLockPatternFilename); 
        } catch (IOException ioe) { 
            // Cant do much 
            Log.e(TAG, "Unable to save lock pattern to " + sLockPatternFilename); 
        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Compute the password quality from the given password string. 
     */ 
    static public int computePasswordQuality(String password) { 
        boolean hasDigit = false; 
        boolean hasNonDigit = false; 
        final int len = password.length(); 
        for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) { 
            if (Character.isDigit(password.charAt(i))) { 
                hasDigit = true; 
            } else { 
                hasNonDigit = true; 
            } 
        } 
 
        if (hasNonDigit && hasDigit) { 
            return DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHANUMERIC; 
        } 
        if (hasNonDigit) { 
            return DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHABETIC; 
        } 
        if (hasDigit) { 
            return DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_NUMERIC; 
        } 
        return DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Save a lock password.  Does not ensure that the password is as good 
     * as the requested mode, but will adjust the mode to be as good as the 
     * pattern. 
     * @param password The password to save 
     * @param quality {@see 
DevicePolicyManager#getPasswordQuality(android.content.ComponentName)} 
     */ 
    public void saveLockPassword(String password, int quality) { 
        // Compute the hash 
        final byte[] hash = passwordToHash(password); 
        try { 
            // Write the hash to file 
            RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(sLockPasswordFilename, "rw"); 
            // Truncate the file if pattern is null, to clear the lock 
            if (password == null) { 
                raf.setLength(0); 
            } else { 
                raf.write(hash, 0, hash.length); 
            } 
            raf.close(); 
            DevicePolicyManager dpm = getDevicePolicyManager(); 
            if (password != null) { 
                int computedQuality = computePasswordQuality(password); 
                setLong(PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, computedQuality); 
                if (computedQuality != DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED) 
{ 
                    dpm.setActivePasswordState(computedQuality, password.length()); 
                } else { 
                    // The password is not anything. 
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                    dpm.setActivePasswordState( 
                            DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED, 0); 
                } 
            } else { 
                dpm.setActivePasswordState( 
                        DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED, 0); 
            } 
        } catch (FileNotFoundException fnfe) { 
            // Cant do much, unless we want to fail over to using the settings provider 
            Log.e(TAG, "Unable to save lock pattern to " + sLockPasswordFilename); 
        } catch (IOException ioe) { 
            // Cant do much 
            Log.e(TAG, "Unable to save lock pattern to " + sLockPasswordFilename); 
        } 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Retrieves the quality mode we're in. 
     * {@see DevicePolicyManager#getPasswordQuality(android.content.ComponentName)} 
     * 
     * @return stored password quality 
     */ 
    public int getKeyguardStoredPasswordQuality() { 
        return (int) getLong(PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, 
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Deserialize a pattern. 
     * @param string The pattern serialized with {@link #patternToString} 
     * @return The pattern. 
     */ 
    public static List<LockPatternView.Cell> stringToPattern(String string) { 
        List<LockPatternView.Cell> result = Lists.newArrayList(); 
 
        final byte[] bytes = string.getBytes(); 
        for (int i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) { 
            byte b = bytes[i]; 
            result.add(LockPatternView.Cell.of(b / 3, b % 3)); 
        } 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Serialize a pattern. 
     * @param pattern The pattern. 
     * @return The pattern in string form. 
     */ 
    public static String patternToString(List<LockPatternView.Cell> pattern) { 
        if (pattern == null) { 
            return ""; 
        } 
        final int patternSize = pattern.size(); 
 
        byte[] res = new byte[patternSize]; 
        for (int i = 0; i < patternSize; i++) { 
            LockPatternView.Cell cell = pattern.get(i); 
            res[i] = (byte) (cell.getRow() * 3 + cell.getColumn()); 
        } 
        return new String(res); 
    } 
 
    /* 
     * Generate an SHA-1 hash for the pattern. Not the most secure, but it is 
     * at least a second level of protection. First level is that the file 
     * is in a location only readable by the system process. 
     * @param pattern the gesture pattern. 
     * @return the hash of the pattern in a byte array. 
     */ 
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    private static byte[] patternToHash(List<LockPatternView.Cell> pattern) { 
        if (pattern == null) { 
            return null; 
        } 
 
        final int patternSize = pattern.size(); 
        byte[] res = new byte[patternSize]; 
        for (int i = 0; i < patternSize; i++) { 
            LockPatternView.Cell cell = pattern.get(i); 
            res[i] = (byte) (cell.getRow() * 3 + cell.getColumn()); 
        } 
        try { 
            MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
            byte[] hash = md.digest(res); 
            return hash; 
        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException nsa) { 
            return res; 
        } 
    } 
 
    private String getSalt() { 
        long salt = getLong(LOCK_PASSWORD_SALT_KEY, 0); 
        if (salt == 0) { 
            try { 
                salt = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG").nextLong(); 
                setLong(LOCK_PASSWORD_SALT_KEY, salt); 
                Log.v(TAG, "Initialized lock password salt"); 
            } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { 
                // Throw an exception rather than storing a password we'll never be able 
to recover 
                throw new IllegalStateException("Couldn't get SecureRandom number", e); 
            } 
        } 
        return Long.toHexString(salt); 
    } 
 
    /* 
     * Generate a hash for the given password. To avoid brute force attacks, we use a 
salted hash. 
     * Not the most secure, but it is at least a second level of protection. First level 
is that 
     * the file is in a location only readable by the system process. 
     * @param password the gesture pattern. 
     * @return the hash of the pattern in a byte array. 
     */ 
     public byte[] passwordToHash(String password) { 
        if (password == null) { 
            return null; 
        } 
        String algo = null; 
        byte[] hashed = null; 
        try { 
            byte[] saltedPassword = (password + getSalt()).getBytes(); 
            byte[] sha1 = MessageDigest.getInstance(algo = "SHA-
1").digest(saltedPassword); 
            byte[] md5 = MessageDigest.getInstance(algo = "MD5").digest(saltedPassword); 
            hashed = toHex(sha1, md5); 
        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { 
            Log.w(TAG, "Failed to encode string because of missing algorithm: " + algo); 
        } 
        return hashed; 
    } 
 
    private static final byte[] HEX_CHARS = new byte[]{ 
            '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 
'F' 
    }; 
 
    private static byte[] toHex(final byte[] array1, final byte[] array2) { 
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        final byte[] result = new byte[(array1.length + array2.length) * 2]; 
        int i = 0; 
        for (final byte b : array1) { 
            result[i++] = HEX_CHARS[(b >> 4) & 0xf]; 
            result[i++] = HEX_CHARS[b & 0xf]; 
        } 
        for (final byte b : array2) { 
            result[i++] = HEX_CHARS[(b >> 4) & 0xf]; 
            result[i++] = HEX_CHARS[b & 0xf]; 
        } 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return Whether the lock password is enabled. 
     */ 
    public boolean isLockPasswordEnabled() { 
        long mode = getLong(PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, 0); 
        return savedPasswordExists() && 
                (mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHABETIC 
                        || mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_NUMERIC 
                        || mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHANUMERIC); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return Whether the lock pattern is enabled. 
     */ 
    public boolean isLockPatternEnabled() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_PATTERN_ENABLED) 
                && getLong(PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, 
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING) 
                        == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Set whether the lock pattern is enabled. 
     */ 
    public void setLockPatternEnabled(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_PATTERN_ENABLED, enabled); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return Whether the visible pattern is enabled. 
     */ 
    public boolean isVisiblePatternEnabled() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_PATTERN_VISIBLE); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Set whether the visible pattern is enabled. 
     */ 
    public void setVisiblePatternEnabled(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_PATTERN_VISIBLE, enabled); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return Whether tactile feedback for the pattern is enabled. 
     */ 
    public boolean isTactileFeedbackEnabled() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_PATTERN_TACTILE_FEEDBACK_ENABLED); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Set whether tactile feedback for the pattern is enabled. 
     */ 
    public void setTactileFeedbackEnabled(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_PATTERN_TACTILE_FEEDBACK_ENABLED, enabled); 
    } 
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    public void setVisibleDotsEnabled(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_DOTS_VISIBLE, enabled);         
    } 
     
    public boolean isVisibleDotsEnabled() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_DOTS_VISIBLE, true); 
    } 
     
    public void setShowErrorPath(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_SHOW_ERROR_PATH, enabled);         
    } 
     
    public boolean isShowErrorPath() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_SHOW_ERROR_PATH, true); 
    } 
     
    public void setShowCustomMsg(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_SHOW_CUSTOM_MSG, enabled); 
    } 
     
    public boolean isShowCustomMsg() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.LOCK_SHOW_CUSTOM_MSG, false); 
    } 
     
    public void setCustomMsg(String msg) { 
        setString(Settings.Secure.LOCK_CUSTOM_MSG, msg); 
    } 
     
    public String getCustomMsg() { 
        return getString(Settings.Secure.LOCK_CUSTOM_MSG); 
    } 
     
    public int getIncorrectDelay() { 
        return getInt(Settings.Secure.LOCK_INCORRECT_DELAY, 2000); 
    } 
     
    public void setIncorrectDelay(int delay) { 
        setInt(Settings.Secure.LOCK_INCORRECT_DELAY, delay); 
    } 
     
    public void setShowUnlockMsg(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.SHOW_UNLOCK_TEXT, enabled); 
    } 
     
    public boolean isShowUnlockMsg() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.SHOW_UNLOCK_TEXT, true); 
    } 
     
    public void setShowUnlockErrMsg(boolean enabled) { 
        setBoolean(Settings.Secure.SHOW_UNLOCK_ERR_TEXT, enabled); 
    } 
     
    public boolean isShowUnlockErrMsg() { 
        return getBoolean(Settings.Secure.SHOW_UNLOCK_ERR_TEXT, true); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Set and store the lockout deadline, meaning the user can't attempt his/her unlock 
     * pattern until the deadline has passed. 
     * @return the chosen deadline. 
     */ 
    public long setLockoutAttemptDeadline() { 
        final long deadline = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime() + FAILED_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS; 
        setLong(LOCKOUT_ATTEMPT_DEADLINE, deadline); 
        return deadline; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return The elapsed time in millis in the future when the user is allowed to 
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     *   attempt to enter his/her lock pattern, or 0 if the user is welcome to 
     *   enter a pattern. 
     */ 
    public long getLockoutAttemptDeadline() { 
        final long deadline = getLong(LOCKOUT_ATTEMPT_DEADLINE, 0L); 
        final long now = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime(); 
        if (deadline < now || deadline > (now + FAILED_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS)) { 
            return 0L; 
        } 
        return deadline; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return Whether the user is permanently locked out until they verify their 
     *   credentials.  Occurs after {@link #FAILED_ATTEMPTS_BEFORE_RESET} failed 
     *   attempts. 
     */ 
    public boolean isPermanentlyLocked() { 
        return getBoolean(LOCKOUT_PERMANENT_KEY); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Set the state of whether the device is permanently locked, meaning the user 
     * must authenticate via other means. 
     * 
     * @param locked Whether the user is permanently locked out until they verify their 
     *   credentials.  Occurs after {@link #FAILED_ATTEMPTS_BEFORE_RESET} failed 
     *   attempts. 
     */ 
    public void setPermanentlyLocked(boolean locked) { 
        setBoolean(LOCKOUT_PERMANENT_KEY, locked); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return A formatted string of the next alarm (for showing on the lock screen), 
     *   or null if there is no next alarm. 
     */ 
    public String getNextAlarm() { 
        String nextAlarm = Settings.System.getString(mContentResolver, 
                Settings.System.NEXT_ALARM_FORMATTED); 
        if (nextAlarm == null || TextUtils.isEmpty(nextAlarm)) { 
            return null; 
        } 
        return nextAlarm; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @return A formatted string of the next calendar event with a reminder 
     * (for showing on the lock screen), or null if there is no next event 
     * within a certain look-ahead time. 
     */ 
    public String getNextCalendarAlarm(long lookahead, String[] calendars, 
            boolean remindersOnly) { 
        long now = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
        long later = now + lookahead; 
 
        StringBuilder where = new StringBuilder(); 
        if (remindersOnly) { 
            where.append(Calendar.EventsColumns.HAS_ALARM + "=1"); 
        } 
        if (calendars != null && calendars.length > 0) { 
            if (remindersOnly) { 
                where.append(" AND "); 
            } 
            where.append(Calendar.EventsColumns.CALENDAR_ID + " in ("); 
            for (int i = 0; i < calendars.length; i++) { 
                where.append(calendars[i]); 
                if (i != calendars.length - 1) { 
                    where.append(","); 
	   64	  
                } 
            } 
            where.append(") "); 
        } 
 
        String[] projection = new String[] { 
            Calendar.EventsColumns.TITLE, 
            Calendar.Instances.BEGIN, 
            Calendar.EventsColumns.DESCRIPTION, 
            Calendar.EventsColumns.EVENT_LOCATION, 
            Calendar.EventsColumns.ALL_DAY 
        }; 
 
        Uri uri = Uri.withAppendedPath(Calendar.Instances.CONTENT_URI, 
                String.format("%d/%d", now, later)); 
        String nextCalendarAlarm = null; 
        Cursor cursor = null; 
 
        try { 
            cursor = mContentResolver.query(uri, 
                    projection, where.toString(), null, 
                    Calendar.Instances.DEFAULT_SORT_ORDER); 
 
            if (cursor != null && cursor.moveToFirst()) { 
 
                String title = cursor.getString(0); 
                long begin = cursor.getLong(1); 
                String description = cursor.getString(2); 
                String location = cursor.getString(3); 
                boolean allDay = cursor.getInt(4) != 0; 
 
                // Check the next event in the case of allday event. As UTC is used for 
allday 
                // events, the next event may be the one that actually starts sooner 
                if (allDay && !cursor.isLast()) { 
                    cursor.moveToNext(); 
                    long nextBegin = cursor.getLong(1); 
                    if (nextBegin < begin + TimeZone.getDefault().getOffset(begin)) { 
                        title = cursor.getString(0); 
                        begin = nextBegin; 
                        description = cursor.getString(2); 
                        location = cursor.getString(3); 
                        allDay = cursor.getInt(4) != 0; 
                    } 
                } 
 
                Date start = new Date(begin); 
                StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
 
                if (allDay) { 
                    SimpleDateFormat sdf = new SimpleDateFormat( 
                            mContext.getString(R.string.abbrev_wday_month_day_no_year)); 
                    // Calendar stores all-day events in UTC -- setting the timezone 
ensures 
                    // the correct date is shown. 
                    sdf.setTimeZone(TimeZone.getTimeZone("UTC")); 
                    sb.append(sdf.format(start)); 
                } else { 
                    sb.append(DateFormat.format("E", start)); 
                    sb.append(" "); 
                    sb.append(DateFormat.getTimeFormat(mContext).format(start)); 
                } 
 
                sb.append(" "); 
                sb.append(title); 
 
                int showLocation = Settings.System.getInt(mContext.getContentResolver(), 
                            Settings.System.LOCKSCREEN_CALENDAR_SHOW_LOCATION, 0); 
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                if (showLocation != 0 && !TextUtils.isEmpty(location)) { 
                    switch(showLocation) { 
                        case 1: 
                            // Show first line 
                            int end = location.indexOf('\n'); 
                            if(end == -1) { 
                                sb.append("\n" + location); 
                            } else { 
                                sb.append("\n" + location.substring(0, end)); 
                            } 
                            break; 
                        case 2: 
                            // Show all 
                            sb.append("\n" + location); 
                            break; 
                    } 
                } 
 
                int showDescription = 
Settings.System.getInt(mContext.getContentResolver(), 
                            Settings.System.LOCKSCREEN_CALENDAR_SHOW_DESCRIPTION, 0); 
 
                if (showDescription != 0 && !TextUtils.isEmpty(description)) { 
                    switch(showDescription) { 
                        case 1: 
                            // Show first line 
                            int end = description.indexOf('\n'); 
                            if(end == -1) { 
                                sb.append("\n" + description); 
                            } else { 
                                sb.append("\n" + description.substring(0, end)); 
                            } 
                            break; 
                        case 2: 
                            // Show all 
                            sb.append("\n" + description); 
                            break; 
                    } 
                } 
 
                nextCalendarAlarm = sb.toString(); 
            } 
        } finally { 
            if (cursor != null) { 
                cursor.close(); 
            } 
        } 
        return nextCalendarAlarm; 
    } 
 
    private boolean getBoolean(String secureSettingKey) { 
        return 1 == 
                android.provider.Settings.Secure.getInt(mContentResolver, 
secureSettingKey, 0); 
    } 
     
    private boolean getBoolean(String systemSettingKey, boolean defaultValue) { 
        return 1 == 
                android.provider.Settings.Secure.getInt( 
                        mContentResolver, 
                        systemSettingKey, defaultValue ? 1 : 0); 
    } 
 
    private void setBoolean(String secureSettingKey, boolean enabled) { 
        android.provider.Settings.Secure.putInt(mContentResolver, secureSettingKey, 
                                                enabled ? 1 : 0); 
    } 
 
    private long getLong(String secureSettingKey, long def) { 
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        return android.provider.Settings.Secure.getLong(mContentResolver, 
secureSettingKey, def); 
    } 
 
    private void setLong(String secureSettingKey, long value) { 
        android.provider.Settings.Secure.putLong(mContentResolver, secureSettingKey, 
value); 
    } 
     
    private int getInt(String systemSettingKey, int def) { 
        return android.provider.Settings.Secure.getInt(mContentResolver, 
systemSettingKey, def); 
    } 
 
    private void setInt(String systemSettingKey, int value) { 
        android.provider.Settings.Secure.putInt(mContentResolver, systemSettingKey, 
value); 
    } 
     
    private String getString(String systemSettingKey) { 
        String s = android.provider.Settings.Secure.getString(mContentResolver, 
systemSettingKey); 
         
        if (s == null) 
            return ""; 
     
        return s; 
    } 
     
    private void setString(String systemSettingKey, String value) { 
        android.provider.Settings.Secure.putString(mContentResolver, systemSettingKey, 
value); 
    } 
 
    public boolean isSecure() { 
        long mode = getKeyguardStoredPasswordQuality(); 
        final boolean isPattern = mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING; 
        final boolean isPassword = mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_NUMERIC 
                || mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHABETIC 
                || mode == DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_ALPHANUMERIC; 
        final boolean secure = isPattern && isLockPatternEnabled() && 
savedPatternExists() 
                || isPassword && savedPasswordExists(); 
        return secure; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Sets the text on the emergency button to indicate what action will be taken. 
     * If there's currently a call in progress, the button will take them to the call 
     * @param button the button to update 
     */ 
    public void updateEmergencyCallButtonState(Button button) { 
        int newState = TelephonyManager.getDefault().getCallState(); 
        int textId; 
        if (newState == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_OFFHOOK) { 
            // show "return to call" text and show phone icon 
            textId = R.string.lockscreen_return_to_call; 
            int phoneCallIcon = R.drawable.stat_sys_phone_call; 
            button.setCompoundDrawablesWithIntrinsicBounds(phoneCallIcon, 0, 0, 0); 
        } else { 
            textId = R.string.lockscreen_emergency_call; 
            int emergencyIcon = R.drawable.ic_emergency; 
            button.setCompoundDrawablesWithIntrinsicBounds(emergencyIcon, 0, 0, 0); 
        } 
        button.setText(textId); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Resumes a call in progress. Typically launched from the EmergencyCall button 
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     * on various lockscreens. 
     * 
     * @return true if we were able to tell InCallScreen to show. 
     */ 
    public boolean resumeCall() { 
        ITelephony phone = 
ITelephony.Stub.asInterface(ServiceManager.checkService("phone")); 
        try { 
            if (phone != null && phone.showCallScreen()) { 
                return true; 
            } 
        } catch (RemoteException e) { 
            // What can we do? 
        } 
        return false; 
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 * @author Rickard Andersson <h05rikan@du.se> 
 * @package AndroidLockScreen 
 *  
 * This script will generate every combination of the android lockscreen gesture, 
calculate 
 * it's corresponding hash and save it to a database. 
 * 
 * This code is released without any license whatsoever, you're free to do what you want 
with it.  
 */ 
 
$dsn = "mysql:dbname=AndroidLockScreen;host=127.0.0.1"; // Change this if you want to 
$user = ""; // Change this 
$pass = ""; // Change this 
 
try { 
    $dbh = new PDO($dsn, $user, $pass); 
} catch (PDOException $e) { 
    echo 'Connection failed: ' . $e->getMessage(); 
    die(); 
} 
 
$sth = $dbh->prepare('INSERT INTO RainbowTable (combination, hash) VALUES (?, ?)'); 
 
$total = 0; 
 
// Generating all the combinations of gestures with length three, four, ..., eight and 
nine  
for ($x = 3; $x <= 9; $x++) { 
  echo "==> Generating table for $x ... \n"; 
 
  $p = new Permutations(9, $x); 
   
  $combinations = 0; 
   
  $values = $p->getCurrent(); 
   
  do { 
    $str = ""; 
     
    foreach ($values as $value) { 
      $str .= chr($value); 
    } 
     
    $hash = sha1($str); 
     
    if ($sth->execute( array( implode(",", $values) , $hash) )) {   
      $combinations++; 
    } else { 
      echo "Error: "; 
      var_dump($sth->errorInfo()); 
    } 
     
  } while (is_array($values = $p->getNext())); 
   
  $total += $combinations; 
     
  echo "==> Done! Inserted $combinations records!\n"; 
} 
 
echo "==> All done with a total of $total records!\n"; 
 
/** 
 * Class for generating permutations of numbers  
 * @author Rickard Andersson 
 */  
class Permutations { 
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  private $n; // How many numbers in each permutation to generate 
  private $maxValue; // The maximum value in each number 
  private $currentValues; // Array of current values 
 
  /**  
   * Public constructor to initiate the class with number boundaries  
   * @param int $max  The highest number in this series 
   * @param int $n    How many numbers to choose from the series of numbers 
   */ 
  public function __construct($max, $n) { 
    $this->n = $n; 
    $this->max = $max; 
    $this->currentValues = range(0, $n -1); 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * Get the current set of values 
   * @return array 
   */ 
  public function getCurrent() { 
    return $this->currentValues; 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * Increase the number and return the resulting set of values 
   * @return array|boolean   Returns false when all permutations have been generated. 
   */ 
  public function getNext() { 
 
    if ( $this->increase($this->n - 1) ) { 
      return $this->currentValues; 
    } else { 
      return false; 
    } 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * Increases the value of the number in the index $index in the set of numbers and 
checks that 
   * the set of numbers still is unique and within boundaries. 
   * @param int $index  Which index to increas 
   * @return int  Returns the new value on success and -1 on failure 
   */ 
  private function findNext($index) { 
   
    $newValue = $this->currentValues[ $index ]; 
     
    do { 
      $newValue++; 
    } while (in_array($newValue, $this->currentValues)); 
     
    if ($newValue >= $this->max) { 
      return -1; 
    } else { 
      return $newValue; 
    }     
  }   
   
  /** 
   * Increases the value of the complete set of values until every value has been 
generated. This is a recursive function and a  
   * call to $index - 1 will be done if the value of the current index gets above the 
given boundary. 
   * @param int $index  
   * @return bool  
   */ 
  private function increase($index) { 
     
    $this->currentValues[ $index ] = $this->findNext($index); 
     
    // findNext() returns -1 on failure and if $index == 0 all the numbers has been 
generated 
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    if ($this->currentValues[ $index ] == -1) { 
      if ($index == 0) {     
        return false; 
      }  
       
      // There might still be numbers to generate, call increase() and try to find a new 
set of numbers 
      // by increasing the number of the index right below this one.  
      else { 
        $success = $this->increase( $index - 1 ); 
         
        // Found a new set of values to work with. Since findNext has returned -1 in the 
first call, calling findNext again 
        // from -1 and upwards will get the lowest available number for this index.  
        if ($success === true) { 
          $this->currentValues[ $index ] = $this->findNext($index); 
          return true; 
        } else { 
          return false; 
        } 
      } 
    } else { 
      return true; 
    } 
  }   
}	  
